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INTRODUCTION
Parker Clote, Symposium Chair, 2009-10: Good Afternoon.  Thank
you all for coming.  I think we are about ready to start. Again thanks
everyone for coming to the Volume Nine Symposium – A Collision of
Authority: The U.S. Constitution and Universal Jurisdiction.  I would
like to thank our distinguished panel for coming, some of whom have
come a long way, and I would like to thank Dean Kristine Henderson
for her help, and Professor Jack Preis for being our moderator, and
also my ad hoc committee.  You all did great work.  Unfortunately, our
fourth panelist Dr. Anthony Arend is unable to be here today due to an
illness in the family.  We wish him well.  As for our panelists: Erwin
Chemerinsky is the Dean of UC Irving.  He is the inaugural Dean.  He
spent most of his time at Duke Law and USC.  His list of publications
1 J.D., Harvard Law School; B.S., Northwestern University
2 J.D., Columbia University School of Law; LL.B., Cambridge University; MSc.,
London School of Economics; B.A., Northwestern University
3 Ph.D., Harvard University; B.A., Cornell University
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is as voluminous as it is distinguished, and I think he has helped more
than one of us through a Con Law exam.  Professor Mary Ellen
O’Connell is here from Notre Dame Law.  She is an authority in the
international community, in international law, and in the law of war.
She also graduated from Northwestern undergrad, and spent time in
the London School of Economics and Cambridge, and she earned her
J.D. from Columbia.  She is a member of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, the German Society of International Law, and the Coun-
cil of Foreign Relations.  Our last panelist is professor Jeremy Rabkin.
He is a professor of law at George Mason University, and he spent over
twenty years at Cornell as a political science professor.  We are very
honored to have them all here today, and I hope that you enjoy the
presentation.
Professor Jack Preis, University of Richmond School of Law:
Welcome, I’m Jack Preis.  I’m going to very briefly set the stage.  The
issue today really has many facets, and I’ll start it with something
very simple.  Really the centerpiece is courts.  The governments create
courts, and the governments tell these courts what to do.
So the government in Germany might create a court system in
Germany, and they might say if there are a bunch of slip and falls on
the streets of Munich, we want you to resolve these disputes, very sim-
ple right?  That is the type of judicial power we are very familiar with.
What if we change the facts a little bit, and Germany says to its’ court,
“We want you to resolve disputes where the defendant is not a Ger-
man, where the plaintiff or the victim is not a German, where the
events did not occur in Germany, and where neither the defendant nor
the victim is any longer near Germany.”  That starts to sound a little
bit different.  The German’s power to resolve that type of dispute, if it
exists at all, and that’s one of the issues we’ll be talking about today, if
that power exists at all, it would be a power that derives from a doc-
trine known as universal jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, courts of a particular sovereign are em-
powered to resolve what are commonly called “crimes against human-
ity” in their own domestic courts.  You might think of it this way:
crimes against humanity under this doctrine can be tried anywhere
humanity resides, and humanity resides everywhere there is a country
in a sense, right?  So every country is competent to resolve this type of
dispute.  A quick example could be, what if Germany decides to prose-
cute Eric Holder for mistreatment of Iraqis that occurred on a CIA
base in Turkey?  Nothing has to do with Germany except the court
itself.  What do we think of that?
So today we are going to talk about these issues, and there are
a couple different facets that arise which our panelists will have a va-
riety of things to say.  One issue that might come up is just power it-
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self.  Where does this German court actually get the power to declare
for all the world what Eric Holder should and should not do?  Another
issue is the nature of the wrongs that can be addressed through courts
exerting international jurisdiction.  What if Germany’s view of torture
is out of step with the rest of the world’s view?  What if Eric Holder’s
view on torture is out of step with the rest of the world?  A third view
might be instrumental – is a court, particularly a court in Germany,
far removed from the dispute itself, the right place to resolve difficult
issues of international politics?  Are the restrictions of the judicial sys-
tem fit, and maybe even further, might it be that local governments
can always resolve their own problems?  Is the American government
competent to resolve problems with Eric Holder?  Maybe so.  So why do
we need Germany?  Well, that’s all I’ll say as a way to set the stage
because we have some people who have studied this in much more de-
tail than I have, and we are happy to have them.  The way this will
work is they will speak for approximately ten to twenty minutes each
depending on the points they’d like to make.  We’ll probably have to
return here and there for some responses, but we look forward to hear-
ing your questions as well.  Thank you very much. Professor
O’Connell, please begin.
O’CONNELL COMMENTARY
Professor Mary O’Connell:  Well, it’s a great pleasure to be here
back on your beautiful campus where my niece, Libby Gragg is a se-
nior.  And it’s also very satisfying to be a part of another important
discussion on these issues.  And I’m really grateful to Parker Clote
that he has organized this event, and I am looking forward to partici-
pating in it with all of you.
Despite the provocative title of our panel today, “Collision of
Authority:  The US Constitution and Universal Jurisdiction,” I’m go-
ing to try to persuade you that the fundamental issue here is not very
controversial, and that it is in fact quite straightforward.  We have a
very good set of rules to determine when courts should decide which
legal issues, the kind of legal issues that Professor Preis just men-
tioned.  The law spells this out, and if we follow the law, we really do
avoid some of the very egregious controversies that have arisen since
9/11.  So let me make some preliminary remarks to show you, to at
least begin this attempt to show you, that there is straightforward law
governing conflicts of jurisdiction, governing when courts should take
jurisdiction in which kinds of cases and which courts.  So for example,
we of course are dealing with these kinds of overlapping jurisdictional
questions all the time.  In the United States we have a federal system
so there are overlapping jurisdictional questions, controversies, or col-
lisions of authority between our local governments, our local courts,
municipal courts, state courts, federal courts, and then of course also
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we live in a global world in which many of us are travelling, doing
business, serving in the armed forces outside of the United States and
that is when other courts come in to play.
But international law has a way for sorting out these overlap-
ping jurisdictional issues, for helping us understand both interna-
tional law and our own domestic law, for sorting out these kinds of
conflicts, and I think it’s really rather straight forward.  So I’ll give a
very common example before I go into the cases that I think are of the
greatest interest to us today, the post 9/11 cases, as they are now
known, and maybe this will make the rest of the discussion a little
easier.  So let’s say that we have an Indiana farmer where I’m from,
South Bend, Indiana, and he is selling corn to a French manufacturer
of biofuels.  So this is an international contract for the sale of goods.  In
this kind of case, if the parties come to a dispute, the law governing
that dispute, governing the contract, will either be the law of the place
of the greatest contact to the contract.  International law allows any of
these three choices of law to sort out which law should govern this
contract.  We have to use international law to sort out conflicts or po-
tential conflicts of legal authority or  legal jurisdiction to sort out these
conflicts of legal authority or legal jurisdiction because we have per-
sons of more than one country involved here, the U.S. and France in
my little hypothetical.  If the French party decides to sue in the United
States under the contract, which of course international law would al-
low, a second set of U.S. rules governing our court system that come
into play, and in particular, U.S. Constitutional rules or civil proce-
dure rules about the authority of our courts to take jurisdiction in such
a dispute, and they have to look to such issues as whether there are
sufficient ties to the U.S. court to hear cases of that kind or forum non
conveniens issues etc.
On 9/11, attacks were carried out in this country by non-Ameri-
cans resulting in the deaths of 3000 people and of course considerable
destruction of property.  Within days of those attacks, the United Na-
tions Security Council found that the attacks had triggered the U.S.’s
legal right under the United Nations charter to act in self-defense.  By
October 7, 2001, the U.S. and the United Kingdom had determined
that Afghanistan was responsible under international law, and in par-
ticular under the International Rules of State Responsibility for viola-
tions of international law, that Afghanistan was responsible for the 9/
11 attacks because of the close ties between Afghanistan’s then gov-
ernment under Mullah Omar and his Taliban colleagues and the ac-
tual 9/11 perpetrators, members of Al-Qaida.  The United States and
the United Kingdom then acted on their right of self-defense and at-
tacked Afghanistan.  When they did so, and upon engagement by Af-
ghan forces, international law made clear- makes clear- that the
general peacetime law prevailing in Afghanistan, the law governing
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acts of violence, like criminal law, was moved out of the legal system
and the international law of armed conflict then became the prevailing
law in the conflict zone.
The international law of armed conflict is found in a variety of
treaties, many of which we know very well, the famous Hague Conven-
tions, the Geneva Conventions, but it is also found in important rules
of customary international law and principles, general principles of in-
ternational law, such as the necessity to use force, and the require-
ment that any attack be proportional.  This law pertaining to armed
conflict permits certain privileges to the regular members of the armed
forces.  These privileges do not apply in peacetime.  The most impor-
tant of these privileges apply only in wartime, only during an armed
conflict, and only to regular armed forces: of the right to kill without
warning, to detain without trial, and to seize property or to destroy
property if it is related to enemy’s military efforts.  These are ex-
traordinary privileges that international law makes clear only apply in
a war zone and even then, these privileges are limited within the con-
text of very important and serious protections on all persons in the
conflict zone. International law of armed conflict applies territorially,
it applies to places where armed conflict is going on.  In all other
places, the regular prevailing peacetime criminal law applies to acts of
violence, or just in general, peacetime civil rights and criminal/civil
law applies.  This is a basic and core conflict or choice of law rules that
we find in international law very important to our discussion today.
The international armed conflict in Afghanistan ended in June
2002.  When Hamid Karzai took over the Afghan government and then
changed the relationship with the United States and the United King-
dom.  He then requested that these two countries and others, now
members of ISAF, come to Afghanistan and assist him in bringing sta-
bility and order to that country.  It became a non-international armed
conflict within Afghanistan and to non-international armed conflict in-
ternational law also has a set of rules that contains the three core priv-
ileges that we just talked about but somewhat less, a lesser group of
protections. Still, the law of both kinds of armed conflict is quite exten-
sive and quite similar.  So far so good with respect to sorting out con-
flicts of legal authority between situations of war and situations of
peace.
But then a strange thing happened, a novel and unexpected
thing in our country.  In November 2001, the President issued an exec-
utive order called Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, and this document asserted a right to try persons before mili-
tary commissions, who, as a member of Al-Qaida or anyone, this is a
quote from the order, who has engaged in, aided or abetted, conspired
to commit acts of international terrorism.
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Now, military commissions may be applied and may be used to
persons detained in the hostilities of an armed conflict but not outside
of an armed conflict. The order, however, made its choice of law, its
determination to use a particular part of the law of armed conflict, the
right to try persons before military commissions, based not on location,
not on the standard rule of choice of law and international law, but on
the identity of certain persons.  This is not supported by international
law.  It was an error by us to make this kind of choice.  It erroneously
applied a law of armed conflict rule to persons not necessarily engaged
in an armed conflict.  But something even more insupportable in law
was to follow.  In February 2002, the White House received a memo
from the Office of Legal Counsel making another choice of law based
again not on who persons are and not where they are.  This memo as-
serted that the law of armed conflict privileges applied everywhere in
the world, but the Geneva Convention protections did not apply to all
persons perceived to be part of this international armed conflict, and
that was the Taliban and Al-Qaida were not to be protected by the
Geneva Convention protections prevailing during armed conflict.  And
then, of course, by August 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel had writ-
ten yet another infamous memo, this one justifying forms of harsh in-
terrogation as not violative of the rules governing interrogation, rule
in peacetime law – the convention against torture, and wartime law –
the Geneva Conventions.
As I’ve already explained, the law of armed conflict applies
where armed conflict occurs.  It has territorial application to all per-
sons in the combat zone, or zone of hostilities, privileges, and for fight-
ers and protections to all persons in the armed conflict zone.  Outside
the armed conflict zone, peacetime criminal law applies to the acts of
violence – criminal law that must in turn comply with international
human rights law.  The law leaves no person out of its protection.
I believe Dean Erwin Chemerinsky will discuss U.S. criminal
law, applicable to persons suspected of carrying out violent acts of ter-
rorism.  I’ll continue my remarks by further explaining why the law of
armed conflict properly applies only in Afghanistan, Iraq, and later in
Iraq and Somalia.  But, that outside of these war zones, because it is
only there that the law of armed conflict or that the choice of law
would apply, the U.S. was in error to try to apply and take the privi-
leges, and certainly made an error to not apply the protections of the
rule of armed conflict.
All of this turns on the fact that there is an armed conflict in
Afghanistan and later in Iraq and Somalia.  International law, of
course,it is expected that international law will define what an armed
conflict is, since this is such an important distinction and makes the
difference in terms of applying – making a choice of law between law of
peace and law of war.  International law in fact does have a definition
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of armed conflict.  An armed conflict cannot be constructed to suit a
particular purpose.  Armed conflict is determined today by facts of
fighting, not mere declarations, as it appeared before the adoption of
the UN Charter.  The International Law Association, a leading schol-
arly organization of international lawyers, tasked a committee on the
use of force in 2005 to report on the evidence within international law
of the definition of armed conflict.  The committee, in its initial report
given in 2008, said this: “Looking to element treaties, in particular in-
ternational humanitarian law treaties, rules of customary interna-
tional law, general principles of international law, judicial decisions,
and the writings of scholars, the committee has found that all armed
conflicts, whether international or non-international, have at least two
minimum characteristics: the existence of organized armed groups en-
gaged in fighting on a certain amount of intensity.  These situations
are more than internal disturbances/tensions such as rise in isolated
and sporadic acts of violence, like terrorist acts.  The single one-off ter-
rorist act is not, under international law, an armed conflict, and the
law of armed conflict, whether privileges or protections, does not
apply.”
Within an armed conflict, as I suggested, the law of armed con-
flict must be followed.  It not only gives privileges, but it demands that
certain protections be afforded to all persons in the territory of the
armed conflict.  Violation of certain fundamental protections in the law
of armed conflict leads to an obligation on all states under principles of
universal jurisdiction to take action to investigate and prosecute.  This
was the international choice of law rule as to the enforcement of the
fundamental law of armed conflict, especially violations in the form of
grave breaches.
Let me just read for you some of the grave breaches listed in
the third Geneva Convention, by way of example.  Grave breaches in-
clude: “willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including biolog-
ical experiments; willfully causing great suffering, or the serious
injury to body or health.”  If any permutation of these violations oc-
curs, every state in the world is obligated under international law to
investigate and prosecute.  Again, and I’ll quote from the Geneva Con-
ventions, “all states shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be committed such
grave breaches and shall bring such persons, regardless of their na-
tionality, to its own courts, and may also, if it prefers, in accordance
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
trial to another high-contracting party to the Geneva Conventions,
provided such high-contracting party has made out a prima facie case.”
All states in the world today are parties to the Geneva Conven-
tions – all 192 sovereign states.  So every state in the world has the
obligation to investigate and prosecute grave breaches of these Con-
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ventions.  Spain, today, is carrying out such a prosecution against ten
United States officials, including the drafter – the primary drafter – of
three memos that I mentioned, John Yoo, but also our Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  This prosecution is going forward as an en-
forcement of the Geneva Convention because of torture that was al-
leged to have been carried out at Guantanamo Bay against persons
who I’ve not yet asserted were or were not a part of an armed conflict
in Afghanistan.  They may also have protections under the Convention
against torture, which has similar universal jurisdiction enforcement
provisions.  But Spain, in carrying out this prosecution’s investigation,
and potential prosecution, is not acting in conflict with any other law.
Under international choice of law, that is the proper procedure for en-
forcing the law of armed conflict.  So I do not see any collision in this
particular case of universal jurisdiction or the exercise of universal ju-
risdiction.  There should be no collision with the United States Consti-
tution, because if you properly apply choice of law provisions, they lead
to a choice of law of armed conflict, including its provisions for enforce-
ment of universal jurisdiction. That’s the proper law.  It’s not the U.S.
Constitution in these cases, and so that should not lead to a conflict.
By the same analysis, persons suspected of violent acts or
plots, such as Abdulmutallab, who alleged to have tried to carry out a
terrorist act on an airplane flying from the Netherlands to Detroit on
Christmas Day.  He carried out his action outside of an armed conflict.
He was not a participant in hostilities.  So he is only properly tried
before a regular civilian criminal court, and not before a military
commission.
In conclusion, there’s no true collision of authority at stake, as I
suggest to you in these cases.  If you do not see a clash between the
U.S. constitution and the conflicting principles of otherwise applicable
jurisdictional or legal authorities, it is a matter of good faith choice of
law made consistently within the overarching paradigm of the rule of
law.
CHEMERINSKY COMMENTARY
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky: It is really an honor and a pleasure to be
with you.  I was delighted to see the invitation from Parker Clote, and
I’ve known Parker Clote longer than he or I would like to admit.  His
parents, Paul and Jackie, are dear friends of mine, very important in
my life, and made the trip from Houston here for the symposium.
The question I pose at the outset is why are we talking about
universal jurisdiction in February of 2010?  The answer, of course, is
that individuals at the highest levels of American government violated
American international law and have not been held accountable in
American courts.  The fact of the matter is: are there tribunals else-
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where in the world where they can be held accountable?  I think to talk
about this, we’ve got to place the events since September 11th in his-
torical context.  I believe that since September 11th, some of the worst
aspects of American history have been repeated.  Throughout Ameri-
can history, whenever there’s been a crisis, especially a foreign-based
crisis, the response has been repression.  The concept I’ve come to real-
ize is that we weren’t any safer.
The story can start in the earliest days of the republic, when in
1798, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act, that made it a crime
to falsely criticize the government or government acts.  Individuals
were convicted under this law for speech tamer than what Jay Leno or
David Letterman say on a daily basis.  Thomas Jefferson ran for presi-
dent in 1800, in part on a platform to get the Alien and Sedition Act
repealed.  This led to pardons for those who were convicted under it.  A
century and a half later, the Supreme Court said that the Alien and
Sedition Act was declared unconstitutional in recorded history.  How-
ever nice that metaphor is, it doesn’t obscure the reality that people
went to prison just for criticizing the president.  During the Civil War,
Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus even though
the president has no authority to do this.  Hundreds, maybe
thousands, of individuals went to prison simply for criticizing the way
the north was waging the Civil War.  Historians show us these impris-
onments violated the Constitution  and did nothing to help the north
in its effort to win the war.
During World War I, Congress passed two statutes in 1917 and
1918 that made it a federal crime to criticize the war. Those who study
First Amendment law have undoubtedly read the case of Schenk v.
United States, where a man was sentenced to ten years in prison just
for circulating a leaflet that said the draft was unconstitutional as in-
voluntary servitude.  There wasn’t a shred of evidence that this leaflet
interfered with the war effort, and yet the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of the sentence.
During World War II, 110,000 Japanese Americans aliens and
citizens, and 70,000 were United States citizens, were uprooted from
their homes and placed in what president Roosevelt called concentra-
tion camps.  Not one Japanese American was ever indicted or con-
victed of espionage against this country.  The deprivation of liberty
was enormous.
One more example before getting to contemporary events, the
Mcarthy era, it was truly the age of suspicion when merely being ac-
cused of being a communist was enough for people to lose their jobs
and sometimes their liberty.  The leading Supreme Court case during
the era was United States v. Dennis - four people were sentenced to
twenty years in prison for the crime of conspiracy to advocate the over-
throw of the United States government.  What did they do? Organized
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to teach the works of Marx, Lenin, and Engles.  They weren’t plotting
the overthrow of the government; they weren’t even convicted of advo-
cating the overthrow of the government. Their crime was conspiracy to
advocate the overthrow of the government, and the Supreme Court up-
held their convictions and sentences, with Chief Justice Fred Vincent
saying, “when the evil is as grave as the overthrow of the government,
there doesn’t have to be any proof that the speech increases the
likelihood.”
Sadly I believe that since September 11th we’ve repeated this,
engaged in repression that hasn’t made the country any safer.  I’d like
to make three points this afternoon.  First, I want to argue that the
government since September 11th has claimed the authority to act un-
constrained by any law.  Second, I want to argue that this is wrong,
that all individuals who were detained must be held and treated ac-
cording to the constitution and international law.  Then finally and
most briefly, I want to argue that in this context universal jurisdiction
is appropriate.  Where there is clear law then tribunals can exist to try
those who are accused of violating that law.  As to the first of the
points I want to make, I think there are two key premises that what
has gone on since September 11th that explain why we are talking
about universal jurisdiction.  First, the government has claimed the
authority to detain and treat certain individuals unconstrained by the
Constitution or international law, and second, they claim that no court
has the authority to review these actions.  Both of these premises
should be familiar to us.  As to the former, starting soon after Septem-
ber 11th, the Bush administration claimed that it could detain individ-
uals as enemy combatants without either the Constitution or
international law applying.  Now international law does not create the
concept of enemy combatant.  In international law there is the notion
of a lawful combatant, somebody who is fighting for a nation in a war
because there are certain things that a person can do in a war includ-
ing using deadly force that would otherwise be a crime.  But there’s not
a separate category of individuals that are unlawful combatants ex-
cluded from protection by the Constitution or international law.
Nonetheless, from the earliest days after September 11th, the
Bush administration claimed that it could detain people and treat
them without either the Constitution or international law applying.
These examples should be familiar to you.  There is the example of
Jose Padilla, apprehended in Chicago at an airport in May of 2002.
His alleged crime was to plot to build and detonate a dirty bomb in the
U.S.  The Bush administration claimed that he could be held as an
enemy combatant and did not need to be indicted tried or convicted.
Think of how stunning this is as a claim of power.  It’s no less
than an authority to suspend the Fourth Amendment, which generally
requires a warrant before someone is arrested.  The Fifth Amendment,
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which requires a grand jury indictment before someone is held.  And
the Sixth Amendment, which requires conviction by a jury before
somebody is imprisoned.  The Bush administration took the position
that since Padilla was an enemy combatant, international law and the
Geneva Courts did not apply to him either.  There is the example of Ali
Al-Marri, a graduate student at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois.
He too was apprehended in 2002.  The government once more said that
he could be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant and neither the
protections of the Constitution nor international law applied.  There is
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen apprehended on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, brought to Guantanamo.  There it was discovered that he
was an American citizen and he was brought then to the United
States.  Once more, the government took the position that he could be
held indefinitely as an enemy combatant, that neither the Constitu-
tion nor international law provided any protection.  There are the
Guantanamo detainees, over 700 individuals have been held in Guan-
tanamo since January 2002.
I have been representing a Guantanamo detainee since July of
2002, a man by the name of Salim Gherebi.  I can tell you in all candor,
without revealing any classified information, that I have no idea why
Gherebi is in Guantanamo.  He may be a very dangerous man who
deserves to be held, or he may be there by mistake.  Many were
brought to Guantanamo by mistake.  The United States paid warlords
in Afghanistan to name those with ties to Al-Qaida.  Some warlords
named rivals to get them out of the way.  Some just gave names to
collect bounties.  Gherebi has never had any meaningful hearing;
there has been no trial.  There is no way to know whether he should be
detained.  The Bush administration consistently took the position from
the time the first detainees were brought to Guantanamo that they
could be held as enemy combatants and neither the Constitution nor
international law applied.
And then there were those who were taken to rendition camps.
We don’t know how many.  In Jane Mayer’s stunning book The Dark
Side, she suggests the sum would be hundreds of thousands.  What’s
more, the government has taken the position that no law, not the Con-
stitution nor international law, applies to detainees.  In fact the Bush
administration has taken the position that its treatment of these de-
tainees is unconstrained by law.  The so called “torture memos” by Jay
Bybee and John Yoo are so important because they claim that the
President unilaterally could ignore both treaties and statutes that pro-
scribed torture, that the President could apply his own definition of
torture that allowed extreme interrogation and allow things that have
been regarded as torture for decades.
So that’s one reason we are talking about universal jurisdic-
tion, because we have a government that has claimed for almost a dec-
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ade that it could hold people unconstrained by any law.  The other
reason we are talking about it is we have a government that has
claimed that its action are not reviewable in any court.  In each of the
cases that I mentioned, the position of the Bush administration was
that no court has the authority to review the detention and treatment.
That was the position of the government in the Padilla case.  In fact, at
the oral argument of the Padilla case there was a stunning exchange
between Justice Ginsburg and Paul Clement, then the Deputy Solici-
tor General.  Justice Ginsburg said, “Is it your position that Jose Pa-
dilla could be held for the rest of his life without any form of due
process?”  And Mr. Clement’s response was “The only due process that
Padilla is entitled to is to respond to the questions put to him by his
interrogators.”  Justice Ginsburg responded saying, and also said in
the companion case, Rasul v. Bush, about the Guantanamo case, “Are
you saying that even if those in Guantanamo were tortured, there
would still be no forum where they could have recourse?”  And the re-
sponse that was given, was that of course that the United States mili-
tary would never engage in torture.  What a coincidence, that night
were the first reports on the national news of what occurred at Abu
Ghraib.  We will never know if that influenced what the Supreme
Court said.
The Supreme Court in the Hamdi case said that while he could
be held as an enemy combatant, he had to be given due process.  The
Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene v. Bush, held that
those in Guantanamo had access to federal habeas corpus.  It is un-
clear what remedies federal courts can give; that is an issue pending
right now before the Supreme Court.  It is also unclear whether or not
habeas corpus will extend to those detained in rendition camps, and
that is now pending in D.C. courts.  It is unclear what remedies will be
available, for example, even the Obama administration is urging a
broad state secrets doctrine that would preclude any civil suits for
abuses.
An example of this, before the Bush administration, was a man
by the name of Khaled El-Masri.  El-Masri was stopped at the German
border, he was stopped based on mistaken identity.  He was simply
confused with another individual with the same name.  Nonetheless
he was taken to a rendition camp where he was brutally tortured.  Ac-
cording to Jane Mayer’s book, a high official at Langley had the suspi-
cion that he was somebody with Al-Qaida ties, and as he did not reveal
any useful information, the extreme interrogation of torture escalated.
Once it was discovered he was there by mistake, he was dumped on
the streets of Albania.  He brought a lawsuit for recourse in federal
courts.  Ultimately the Court of Appeals held that the because of the
state secrets doctrine, he could not get any recourse.  The Obama ad-
ministration has considered continuing the position of the Bush ad-
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ministration using the state secrets doctrine to block any judicial
review.
So these two premises: one, that individuals who are detained
and treated where no law applied, and that no court would have the
opportunity to review, got us talking about universal jurisdiction.  Go-
ing along with them, I think, is the choice of the Obama administra-
tion not to investigate or prosecute those in the Bush administration
responsible for violations of the law.  Entirely for political reasons, the
Obama administration has said that even if those in the top-level of
the Bush administration had violated the law it would be better not to
have a truth commission, better not to have an investigation, better
not to have prosecutions.
This explains then, why we’re talking about universal jurisdic-
tion.  Well, the second point I want to make I hope is the most obvious.
All who are detained must be done so in accord with the Constitution
and international law.  There is no authority of any government to act
unconstrained by any law.  No.  I can give you a pragmatic reason for
this.  I’ve given so many speeches since September 11th.  What I’ve
always been surprised to see is that individuals in the audience mostly
in agreement with my position are those who have served in the mili-
tary or with loved ones in the military.  What I’ve heard from them
over and over again is, “How can the United States expects foreign
governments to follow international law in treating American prison-
ers if the United States doesn’t follow international law in treating
foreign prisoners?”  There’s also a principle that’s involved here.  It’s
the principle of the rule of law – that when the government deprives
individuals of liberty, it has to follow the law.  The rule of law requires
that there be predictable legal standards and that they be enforceable.
And those standards exist.  The standards are following the United
States Constitution.  Now the reach of the United States Constitution
is uncertain.
We know the Constitution applies to anyone who is appre-
hended in the United States.  There’s no doubt the Constitution ap-
plies to Jose Padillo or Ali Al-Marri who were apprehended for actions
in the United States.  I think it applies clearly to any who are detained
in the United States.  That would include then Yaser Hamdi or anyone
brought to the United States.  I think by implication, the Supreme
Court in Hasul and Boumediene were saying that Guantanamo, since
it’s under American sovereignty, is also covered by the Constitution.
Does the Constitution apply to rendition camps?  That we don’t know.
But even there, there’s law to be applied.  Professor O’Connell put it
out.  There are the Geneva Courts, there are the covenants of individ-
ual liberties and civil rights.  And my position is that anytime any gov-
ernment is detaining individuals, treating individuals, it has to comply
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with the law.  There is no black hole where individuals can be held and
treated unconstrained by the law.
Well this then brings me to the third and final point I’m going
to make.  To me this explains why universal jurisdiction is appropri-
ate.  It is appropriate for tribunals throughout the world to try those
who violate their national standards.  Now it might seem that this is a
radical proposition, but it’s been part of American law, at least with
regard to civil liabilities, since the earliest days of the republic.  One of
the very first statutes that Congress adopted was the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.  The Alien Tort Statute creates civil liability in American courts
for those who violate the law of nations.  Just a few years ago, in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that individuals
can be sued in the United States for human rights violations, even if
they occur elsewhere.  And there have been lawsuits brought under
the Alien Tort Statute, successful ones, for human rights violations
that occurred throughout the world.
This is universal jurisdiction. Tribunals have been created that
exercise universal jurisdiction.  To give you an example - the Nurem-
berg Tribunal that existed after World War II. What authority did the
United States and other notorious nations have to try German war
criminals?  Their defense was that they were just following the law of
their country and the United States took the position and, nations
throughout the world, that there is a law of nations and that tribunals
can be created to enforce that law of nations. That is what the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction is about.
So is it appropriate for Donald Rumsfeld to hold you and others
for violating international law?  Yes, now whether they can get per-
sonal jurisdiction over these individuals is a different matter.  But in
terms of subject matter jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction exists.  I
conclude with two quotes from the late Supreme Court justices.  One is
from the late Justice Robert Jackson who said, “The Constitution is
not a suicide pact.”  Of course he is right.  But before we give up consti-
tutional rights, is it really necessary to do so for national security?
The Constitution has been able to be complied with for 200 years.  The
point of my examples from the beginning is when we deviated from it
in the name of national security, did we really make the country any
safer?  The other quote comes from the late Justice Lewis Brandeis, he
said, “The greatest threat to liberty will come from a proclaimed act for
beneficial purposes.”  He said people know to resist the tyranny of des-
pots.  He said the insidious threat to freedom will come from well
meaning people with zeal, with a little understanding of what the Con-
stitution is about. If Lewis Brandeis ever knew John Ashcroft, or Al-
berto Gonzales, or John Yoo, or Dick Cheney, it couldn’t have been
better words for them.
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RABKIN COMMENTARY
Professor Jeremy Rabkin: I have a different view or two.  And I
guess I should say, when I was invited to come here, I was told they
really wanted John Bolton, but he wasn’t available, you’re his under-
study.  I said, “Oh, thank you.”  To be the understudy of John Bolton is
very flattering, and I will try to live up to that distinguished honor.
What you just heard Professor Chermerinsky say was we have
been doing this since 1789.  We’ve been doing this since 1789 because
we’ve always had this view if you commit a terrible crime you should
be punished.  And it’s not punished by American authorities, you
should be punished by international authorities.  That was always our
view.
I want you to just stop and think.  He gave you his version of
American history: terrible depression through the first world war -
some people were put in jail.  Alien-sedition Acts - some people were
put in jail.  Here’s my version of American History:  for the first hun-
dred years we had millions of people in awful bondage in slavery.  The
first twenty years after the Constitution went into affect we were par-
ticipating in the international slave trade at a time when everyone else
in the world thought, “oh that’s really awful.”  We did a lot of bad stuff
in the Civil War, as probably some people from the South remember,
and let’s just skip to more recent times.  He’s concerned about, “some
people were prosecuted for their speeches.”  We killed about 600,000
German civilians by bombing their cities in the second world war, and
then as you recall we dropped two atomic bombs on Japan.  Now if it
were true that universal jurisdiction was “always part of world heri-
tage law,” you have to ask how come General Sherman, how come Gen-
eral Grant weren’t afraid to travel the world?  How come southern
officials who were involved in the slave trade weren’t afraid to travel
the world?  How come President Truman and people in his administra-
tion weren’t afraid to travel the world?  And of course the real answer
is this is a doctrine that is made up which never previously existed.
We did not think in 1789 we could try anyone or that anyone could try
us.  This is a very, very recent creation.
Don’t be misled by their focusing on John Yoo.  That’s, I mean
I’m sorry, but this is a fetish.  I guess law professors are upset about it,
and I’m a law professor.  But the truth is, right now, President Obama
is ordering air strikes on people who are not combatants in Pakistan
and in Yemen.  If it’s true that there is international law, and it is
absolutely clear because Professor O’Connell and the Red Cross have
said so, so it’s absolutely clear, you are either engaged in a recognized
international conflict, which means an international conflict in a par-
ticular place where there’s armies fighting, or else you are entitled to
civilian trials, or otherwise it’s a black hole.  Obama is doing some-
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thing much worse than anything John Yoo did.  What Obama is doing
is killing civilians in Yemen and Pakistan without any warning, let
alone a trial.  Let’s all take a deep breath and focus on that.  We aren’t
talking about John Yoo; we are talking about Barack Obama.  And, we
are probably talking about Eric Holder and people in the Justice De-
partment who told him, “Yeah, that’s okay.”  We’re for sure talking
about people in the Defense Department who not only said its okay,
but salute it, and did it.  So we’re not talking about the Bush people,
we’re talking about Obama, we’re talking about now.  What’s happen-
ing in the world?  Well, some people criticize, some people raise ques-
tions.  I haven’t heard anyone say there should be universal
jurisdiction trials of Obama and his cabinet in Europe.  And why not?
I think the real reason is because none of this is serious, we’re just
kidding, and it’s all just stunts.  Let me start with, oh let me just say
one other thing on this rebuttal - we were talking about how terrible it
was that people who were being held - combatant people who weren’t
really combatants were being held in Guantanamo, and wasn’t that
terrible?
Because what I understood Professor O’Connell to say was
there are only two categories: you are a privileged combatant in which
case you can hold people - because it’s a real war, and you are privi-
leged to be a combatant in a real war, and if you’re captured in a real
war you can hold them; or else there has to be ordinary due process.
There is no in between, that would be a black hole, and that would be a
war crime or, in any way, a crime against humanity, or any way
against international law to do the “in between.”  Well, if that’s really
the doctrine, and if people who say, “Yes, it’s OK to do the in between,”
are international criminals who, if not tried here, can be tried else-
where, we should start with Justice O’Conner, she’s still alive.  And
she’s out there.  She’s not in office, so she won’t have official immunity.
Let’s get her, because she authorized this.  She said, “Yes.”  You can
hold people in Guantanamo.  It doesn’t matter where they came from,
it’s not just people that were captured in a war zone, not just combat-
ants.  You can hold them there if they are dangerous.  And if they are
right, if that’s against international law, let’s have the (Germans?
Journalists?) go after Justice O’Connor.  Good luck.
I want to start by saying – I mean what I wanted to say – I
think if we want to talk about collision. I guess my fellow panelists
were saying, “Well there is no collision because good people in America
are for universal justice, and the world is for universal justice, and the
constitution is for universal justice, so it’s all universal and it’s all just,
and there is no collision.”  I disagree with that.  And I want to start by
saying I think there is question whether the Constitution does author-
ize universal jurisdiction.  There is this clause, of course, in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10: “The powers of Congress include the powers to
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define and punish piracies and felonies committed on high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations.”  If you stop and think about this,
which almost no one does, it’s interesting that they break out those
things separately.  Why don’t they just say offenses against the law of
nations?  Why piracy, and other offenses on the high seas?  Why isn’t
that all included in the law of nations?  A really excellent article by a
scholar at Northwestern, Eugene Kontorovich, who used to be my col-
league at George Mason University – great article if you are really in-
terested in this – and he digs out that, actually if you go back to the
founders, they thought of these as separate categories, and what they
were really thinking about was piracies committed against Americans,
offenses on the high seas committed by Americans, and offenses
against the law of nations committed in the United States.  Each one
of these separate items had a different jurisdictional basis.
There was actually a big debate in 1800 in the House of Repre-
sentatives involving the sailors who had been involved in a mutiny on
a British ship.  They were British sailors who killed their British of-
ficers.  Some of them came into the United States, and President Ad-
ams extradited them back to Britain for trial.  This was criticized, and
people said, “Why are we giving in to Britain?  They won’t get justice
there.  We should have our own trial.”  Somebody got up in the House
of Representatives and said, “We couldn’t possibly have jurisdiction
over a crime committed on a British ship by British nationals on the
high seas.”  He said, “That clause in the Constitution which enables
Congress to define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas
can never be construed to make to the government a grant of power
which the people making it do themselves possess.  The people of the
United States have no jurisdiction over offenses committed onboard
foreign ships against a foreign nation.  Of consequence, in framing a
government for themselves they cannot have passed this jurisdiction
to that government.”
In other words, the meaning of this clause couldn’t possibly re-
fer to “you can just try anyone for anything without any jurisdictional
connection to the United States.”  The person who gave this speech
was John Marshall, Congressman from Virginia.  President Adams
said, “That is a terrific speech; you should be Secretary of State.”  And
after that he said, “Come to think of it, you should be Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.” And his decisions for the Supreme Court are con-
sistent with this in regard to piracy.  He said, “We don’t have jurisdic-
tion over even acts of piracy if committed by non-Americans against
non-Americans out on the high seas.  Universal jurisdiction is not
something that the United States can exercise.”
Nobody has yet found a case in which the United States did
exercise this in the nineteenth century, or anytime in the twentieth
century until, really, it starts with this case - Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
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in 1980, in which some international lawyers persuaded the Second
Circuit that, “Oh yes, we could have jurisdiction under this 1789 stat-
ute which doesn’t mean what you used to think it meant.”  If it really
meant universal jurisdiction, anyone can file suit against anyone else
in American courts.  We should have loads of cases because that would
be so much fun to do.  A lot of people would like to have done that.  No
one before 1980 thought this, and the Supreme Court has subse-
quently told us, “Well no, not really.  Actually kind of . . . no.”
So, I think it is a real question whether we are authorized to do
this by the Constitution, whether Congress is.  The one important de-
ception is if whether it were by treaty, then I think that Congress
could assert jurisdiction, but it wouldn’t be universal jurisdiction.  We
would have jurisdiction in those situations in which other countries,
signatories to the treaty, had agreed to it, and I think that it could
cover certain international tribunals.  I think in the case of Nurem-
berg, our actual justification was you surrendered unconditionally to
us, we are now in charge – the four occupying powers.  It was dele-
gated authority, it wasn’t universal jurisdiction.  I believe the reason
why Marshall and other people, to begin with, thought this cannot be
right – it cannot be this free floating, just put anyone on trial for any-
thing  if you want to.  I believe they have this understanding that the
logic of that would undermine our own Constitution at home.
Let me just quickly, I don’t have time to argue this through,
but let me just pose this to you.  A few things in the United States
Constitution – Congress has the power to declare war and to make
rules for the government in regulation of the armed forces.  If I under-
stood Professor McConnell’s argument it is that when you act in a way
that violates international standards, other countries can prosecute
you if you don’t prosecute the people who did it.  So suppose Congress
declares a war that other countries think is improper under interna-
tional law.  Suppose we authorize our troops to do things that other
countries think are improper.  It seems to me the logic of universal
jurisdiction is that the other countries can then put our defense offi-
cials on trial, maybe our members of Congress on trial, and where that
goes is that we don’t get to decide for ourselves.  And these provisions
in the Constitution that vest this power in Congress become nullified.
The President has the power under the Constitution, Article 2, to par-
don offenses against the United States.  Well, if other countries don’t
have to respect the pardon or the amnesty that the president may give,
has the power to give, then it turns out that he doesn’t really have an
effective pardon power because people still have to be afraid that, “Oh,
I am going to be prosecuted in Germany or somewhere else.”  So the
pardon power which was supposed to be a way for us to settle some
claims, it doesn’t settle them anymore, we always have to be worried
about Spain, France, Germany, one of those other countries.  The Con-
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stitution is the supreme law of the land, according to Article 6, that
means it overrides everything else.  Well, how can it if adhering to our
constitutional norms we can be prosecuted in other countries?
A point which I do really want to emphasize – we shouldn’t
think of this as just the favorite provisions of my colleagues here.
There are a lot things that other countries think that are international
law or should be international law.  Professor McConnell mentioned
customary international law.  Customary international law is very,
very loose.  A lot of people think customary international law can be
determined by UN resolutions, where we have now had I think four
UN resolutions saying basically if you insult Islam you have violated
human rights, and you should be prosecuted.  A lot of countries have a
view of free speech which is free speech needs to be constrained if some
people are offended.  It is ultimately the international covenant of civil
and political rights that you have no right to advocate for war or en-
gage in hate speech.  A lot of countries think that allowing this in
America is wrong, or they are moving towards that view.  So I think
you can easily extrapolate, not very far down the road, other countries
saying that we are all suppressing this, so you should be doing the
same.  I hope Professor Chemerinsky will be on my side then and say,
“Oh wait, actually America is entitled to have its own view and we
shouldn’t allow foreigners to prosecute Americans for living under the
American Constitution.”
But I believe the logic of what he said leads in the other direc-
tion, which is if you don’t adhere to the international standard then
other countries have the right to prosecute Americans for not living up
to what these other countries think is the proper international stan-
dard.  I want to say in conclusion I think if you think this through, it is
not only potentially at odds, there is collision, potentially, with the
American Constitution, but I think the whole idea of constitutional-
ism.  Because the logic of this is not limited to actual treaties but to
interpretation of treaties, the Geneva Convention citation that you
have there – gee there should have been lots and lots of prosecutions
under that if it were understood by other countries the way it was
presented.  Nobody has had such prosecution happen.  I don’t think it
was understood that way.  I don’t believe the United States would
have agreed to that in 1949 if they understood what they were saying
was, “Oh yeah, and if you think there is any question about how we
fought our most recent war go ahead and prosecute Americans.”  I
don’t believe that that’s what it means.  But if you are saying other
countries interpretations of treaties, and even worse, other countries
interpretations of evolving standards of practice, decency, custom,
whatever you want to call it, if you think those things lay the basis for
prosecution, then there is not just potential collision with our own
Constitution, but with the idea of constitutionalism.
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The history of the world, if I could give my history. This is
somewhat broader.  People used to think there should be a universal
authority - a papacy, a caliphate, because they know what justice is in
the way that God wants it to be.  And the other alternative there was
there are many gods, and every city has its own god and therefore
should be ruled by someone in contact with the particular god of the
city to say what is just and unjust.  In the history of the world we are
constantly getting sort of theological, theocratic, interpretations, with
people claiming the authority to enforce them.  What I think is most
crucial about modern constitutional government and how we have
come to understand it is this is a way in which a people constitutes
itself and says these are the rules by which we agree to be governed.
This vision of universal jurisdiction which just sort of flows
along, which just evolves and has new interpretations of new practices
is really at odds with a fundamental understanding that we have in
the modern world of what a constitutional government is.  Constitu-
tional government is, in the first place, what you want to know is who
is authorized to make law.  We know what it is here – it’s the house the
Senate, the President.  We have this little debate about reconciliation
and the filibuster, but we know for sure that it is the House, the Sen-
ate, and the President.  Obama cannot say, “You know what, the Sen-
ate is just too much trouble.  I won in the House – that is good enough.”
We have a constitution that spells this out.  We have nothing like this
for the evolving standards to be applied by the courts invoking univer-
sal jurisdiction, and so I think we, and we know who gets to vote for
the House and the Senate.  We have rules about this, and some of
these rules are in the Constitution, the most important ones are – this
is how we constitute ourselves.  Who gets to hand down decisions in-
voking universal jurisdiction?  Which countries?  Is it only democra-
cies?  What about the tyrannies?  What about the anti-American
countries?  What about the really nasty hostile countries - does their
authority count just as much?  It’s supposed to be universal.
We have really no way of knowing where this is going or what
it is really about, so I think potentially it is really a very serious colli-
sion, and I think it is very important for us to be clear, however much
you hate John Yoo, call him names, write articles, denounce him, if
you want you can say that he will never be hired at your law school.  If
you want, you can even say that the Justice Department was wrong.
By the way the Justice Department cleared him, so we are saying now
that the Justice Department is not fit to decide whether John Yoo com-
mitted a crime, we need a court in Germany.  Don’t do that, that is a
very dangerous thing, let us decide for ourselves what our standards
should be, and who should be punished.  It’s really the worst thing you
can do.  I think it is a betrayal not only of this country but of the idea of
constitutional government, and  I firmly do believe that it is a betrayal
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of any possibility of international order, countries living together in
peace if you let loose this very new thing which has no real foundation
to it, and very little practice behind it.  Yeah, if we don’t like something
you did our courts can just go after you even if you have no connection
to our country, it is a really terrible mistake – and we shouldn’t let it
loose.  Thank you.
DISCUSSION
Preis: We’ve heard three great presentations from our guests. And I
am sure each of them will have something to say to the other two, so
we can take this in any order you’d like, who’d ever like to begin.
O’Connell: I am not sure I followed everything Professor Rabkin was
putting forth, but I do feel very strongly about a number of his points,
and I want to just respond to a few of the most important.  I heard
Professor Rabkin say again and again something about Americans
shouldn’t be prosecuted abroad.  Americans are prosecuted abroad reg-
ularly.  If they are living in another country in France, in Chad, in
Costa Rica and they violate the law of that country they will be prose-
cuted.  It is simply a myth that, and I am  not sure exactly what Pro-
fessor Rabkin had in mind, that Americans are somehow only subject
to U.S. national courts. That is not the way the world works, and we
have as a world agreed that we held several very important principles
in common, and that these are the rules of the road for our coexistence
as an international community, and these rules, the most important
rules, we agree should be prosecuted, should be enforced and if one, if
the state that is the most natural state to do it, usually the state of
nationality doesn’t.  Others will.  These are the agreements we’ve
made.  We don’t live up to our agreements very well, but I think it is
our obligation, especially as lawyers, to constantly work to make sure
we do uphold our highest principles that we have committed to in our
treaties and in our most important rules of customary international
law.  We decided at Nuremburg, it was this country that decided that
crimes of genocide, war crimes, violations of the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion for the protection of prisoners, and crimes against humanity, fun-
damental human rights crimes, should not go unpunished.
And we, not out of the blue, but working on a model that had
already been developed in the Treaty of Versailles, for trying the Kai-
ser in the first world war, we created a court that would hold persons,
on behalf of the whole international community, for these important
crimes.  That was 1946 that the judgment in the international military
tribunal came down.  The Geneva Conventions that we honor today,
and we are a party too, that govern our armed forces in the field were
adopted in 1949, three years after Nuremburg.  So, Professor Rabkin,
we knew very well what we were doing in Stockholm at the Geneva
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Convention negotiations, and in the final negotiations.  We sent some
of our most brilliant military officers to negotiate for us at those Ge-
neva Conventions.
These are the documents that they wanted, and these are the
documents that we train our armed forces in over the years that,
under which, we have modified our uniformed code of military justice
to comply with so we are at the international standard, that we have
tried persons such as Lieutenant Calley, where we did fulfill our obli-
gations, and then in the Gulf War, we fought in a model way.  My hus-
band was a United States Army interrogator in the Gulf War, and he
was also the Geneva Convention’s trainer for his division, and he is not
a lawyer, but he has always told me that it was the fact that he and his
men knew what the rules were that made them feel that they were
fighting in a righteous way and in a righteous conflict, and in which we
did not have the cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.  Our soldiers
then knew the rules and they knew they were fighting in compliance
with them.  When we captured persons, we didn’t know if they were
combatants subject to detention or not, or might have been civilians,
we held hearings under Article Five of the Third Geneva Conventions.
We held almost 1500 such hearings.  We did it by the book.  We kept
prisoners according to the Geneva Conventions standards, and we won
that war after 100 hours of fighting.  Many persons in the Iraqi armed
forces surrendered to the United States armed forces because they
knew they would be well treated.  We are still in Afghanistan, eight
years after 9/11, nine years, going on nine years.  I suggest to you if we
had made the same care and concern about how we were fighting that
conflict, we would be in far better shape today.
But the other thing that I do have to say, in agreement with
Professor Rabkin, is that I never said the Obama administration has
somehow turned the page and has brought us to a new day in which
we are in compliance, in which we are supporting the rule of law in the
world, in particular the Geneva Conventions and the important
human rights treaties, especially the convention against torture.  Very
sadly, I believe the Obama administration is taking very bad advice
and following along on the Bush administration’s path that is not help-
ing our country, that is not helping our world.  I have written a num-
ber of articles in which I have argued that the use of drones in
Pakistan today, being run by the CIA, not by our armed forces, who
have no right to use military force even in an armed conflict, and there
is not an armed conflict in much of Pakistan in which we are using
drones.  And we do not have a right to do it, and I believe it is as seri-
ous a violation of the Geneva Conventions and the law of armed con-
flict as many of the violations that occurred during the Obama
administration.  So, I do take umbrage with Professor Rabkin that he
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would suggest that this is a political position rather than an objective
and important legal position that I put forward.
Rabkin: I totally agree with your first point.  Of course Americans,
when they commit a crime in another country are subject to the juris-
diction of that country.  No one is disputing that.  I didn’t think that
had anything to do with universal jurisdiction.  Every country has ju-
risdiction in its own territory.  I also concede that when somebody
makes a decision in the United States that has an effect in another
country, victims in the other country might have some claim to juris-
diction. That’s going to be difficult, and we hope that they will be really
cautious and careful about that, but what makes universal jurisdiction
so dangerous is it’s inviting 200 countries in the world to say, “Ah
yeah, come to think of it, we have a view on this too.”  And I do not
think it is true that there is any history of that.  If there were history
of that, the world would have been much more chaotic than it was.
I want to say briefly what you said about, “This is something
new because in the Vietnam War we prosecuted Lieutenant Calley.”
Well yes we did, and then President Nixon pardoned him.  He commit-
ted a monstrous crime, right?  This is a guy who burned this village
and killed a lot of people – I think about 100 people – women and chil-
dren – a really ugly, horrible crime. President Nixon pardoned him, I
think after one year.
O’Connell: Commuted his sentence.  Didn’t pardon him.  Commuted
his sentence.
Rabkin: Commuted his sentence, eh!
O’Connell: He shortened it from life in prison.
Rabkin: To?
O’Connell: To house arrest; he did serve some time.
Rabkin: Not very much!  I think there were a lot of things that we did
in Vietnam which were very questionable and a lot of the world
thought that in fact it was a terribly unjust war and the Americans
were behaving very badly.  We didn’t see any prosecutions of Ameri-
cans at that time. If Vietnam wanted to assert jurisdiction, that would
be something else, but we didn’t see France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Spain doing it.  I have absolutely no doubt that your husband
behaved extremely honorably.  I’m in favor of the Geneva Conventions.
I’m in favor of conforming to the right standards of interrogation.  I
didn’t mean to mock any of that.  I do say though that there are rea-
sonable questions of interpretation, and it is not reasonable to have
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third parties that have nothing to do with it come in and say, “No, the
American interpretation is wrong,or the American practice is wrong.
And, therefore, we’re going to prosecute.”
The last thing, you said that you were taking umbrage that I
was suggesting that you were being partisan.  No – I withdraw that.  I
am sorry.  I didn’t mean to say that you were being partisan.  What I
did mean to say, and will say again is I think it is short-sighted for
anyone to think that this approach to justice once it is unleashed can
be limited to the people you happen to think are really bad, like John
Yoo.  Once it is unleashed in the world it could be applied to a lot of
people, and although you think that President Obama is behaving
badly, I personally think that what he is doing is very reasonable.  I
have a lot of respect for the armed forces, I don’t believe those JAG
lawyers would be all so quiet if they thought that it was against inter-
national law.  So I think that a lot of serious people, who are at least as
serious as you and me, and probably more so because their careers
really revolve around making these decisions, have told President
Obama that this is a reasonable thing to do, and I don’t think that it
should be second guessed, at least at the level of criminal law, by coun-
tries in Europe who will not do anything to help us actually fighting in
Afghanistan.
Chemerinsky: I think that all three of us agree about the importance
of constitutionalism and of enforcing the Constitution’s protections for
individuals.  I think we all agree about the importance of treaties and
treaties being enforced.  So, what we’re really talking about is: what is
the best way to achieve this?
Now, when I was talking I made three points. One was that
since September 11th the government has claimed the authority to de-
tain and treat people unconstrained by the Constitution or interna-
tional law.  I think that it is so important to keep this in mind.  It is
the context for our discussion of universal jurisdiction, and if we’re go-
ing to talk about what is unprecedented – this really is unprecedented
in American history.  In the Vietnam War the United States created
an accord with the Geneva courts, tribunals to determine whether or
not individuals were Viet Cong or innocent civilians. Even though the
Viet Cong were not following the protocols of war and the Geneva Ac-
cords, we held the tribunals that the Geneva Accords required.  As
Professor O’Connell said, we did this with regard to the Iraq War.  To
my knowledge, never before in American history had the United
States claimed it could detain and treat people completely without re-
gard to the Constitution or international law.  To my knowledge, never
before in American history had the United States government claimed
the authority to torture individuals, unconstrained by federal law or
international law.  Going back to the time of George Washington, the
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United States always prided itself on humane treatment of foreign
prisoners, even when our enemy was not treating American prisoners
in a humane fashion.  The United States was a key party making sure
the Geneva Accords were drafted and adopted.
The second point that I made was that all who are held, all who
are treated, must be done so in accord with the Constitution and inter-
national law.  Professor Rabkin talked about the importance of Consti-
tutionalism, and I could not agree more.  There should never be an
instance where a government can hold individuals unconstrained by
any law.  That is inconsistent with the very notion of the rule of law.
So that brought me to my third point, the concept of universal
jurisdiction.  Now I realize that one way all of us on this panel have
been at fault this afternoon is we’ve never defined what we mean by
universal jurisdiction.  And I realize that part of the problem, what
may be generating unnecessary heat, is that we may not have the
same definition of universal jurisdiction.  I think universal jurisdiction
is the authority of an accord to try individuals, civilly or criminally, for
conduct that did not occur within its territorial jurisdiction.  Now, we
may have different definitions of universal jurisdiction, but I think
that is what we are talking about here. And then there is really a de-
scriptive and a normative question: descriptively, has universal juris-
diction ever existed?  Have nations ever tried individuals for things
that occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction?  And the answer is it
has gone on for centuries.  I gave the example of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute; it was adopted in 1789.  It says that federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear civil suits against those who violate the Law of Nations.
Now, we can certainly argue the extent to which it went on before
1980, we would disagree over that, but I don’t think we can disagree
that the United States Supreme Court, just a few years ago, in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, reaffirmed that federal courts have the authority to
hear civil suits in actions that occurred outside of the United States,
outside of our territorial jurisdiction, that violate the Law of Nations.
I’ll give you one example: Doe v. Unocal.  There was a lawsuit
brought in federal district court in California against Unocal for using
slave labor in Burma.  The plaintiffs were individuals whose rights
were violated outside the territorial United States.  I can give you doz-
ens of civil suits that were brought by individuals for human rights
violations that occurred outside the United States. Descriptively,
there’s no doubt that there’s this form of universal jurisdiction.
Both Professor O’Connell and I have mentioned the Nuremberg
tribunals.  There’s no doubt that this occurred – they were trying indi-
viduals for things that were lawful under their country’s law.  And the
United States, leading the way, said there are crimes against laws of
nations.  Now, so in this sense, universal jurisdiction has long existed.
Now, Professor Rabkin says, but look at all the instances where uni-
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versal jurisdiction wasn’t exercised.  And of course he’s right, but the
fact that it hasn’t been used in many instances doesn’t deny that, de-
scriptively, it exists.  Now there are many reasons it hasn’t been used
in the past.  I briefly mentioned the concept of personal jurisdiction – I
mean, the difficulty of personal jurisdiction is enormous because you
can hold whatever kind of trial you want, but it’s meaningless if you
don’t have the territorial authority to bring that person in.  And na-
tions often lack that.  And the lack of territorial authority of personal
jurisdiction is why you often don’t see universal jurisdiction exercised.
But the fact that it hasn’t been used in many instances descriptively
doesn’t deny that it exists.
Also, power matters enormously.  The reality is that those who
win the war can then exercise universal jurisdiction; those who lose
the war don’t.  Those who have power can exercise universal jurisdic-
tion; those who don’t haven’t used it.  I think of the trials that have
occurred at the Hague, say, against Milosevic.  That’s an exercise of
universal jurisdiction.
Now – so, descriptively, it exists.  And that leaves us to talking
about: normatively, should it exist?  I think a lot of the arguments that
are made against it are really strawpersons.  For example, Professor
Rabkin repeatedly wants to talk about – what are the amorphous stan-
dards that are used?  I’m talking about the Constitution and treaties
that exist.  I’m not talking about some amorphous concept here.  We
ratified the Geneva Accords.  We ratified treaties that prohibit torture.
And the question is: if that law is violated, can there be prosecution?
Professor Rabkin wants to talk about the importance of consti-
tutionalism.  We agree – to me, that’s what the rule of law is all about.
And to the extent there are written legal standards, or for that matter,
customary international law – and they’re there in the form of our
Constitution, treaties, or what the Supreme Court has referred to as
the law of nations – then I think there can be prosecutions.  But I’m
going to agree with Professor Rabkin that there is a danger to univer-
sal jurisdiction.  There’s certainly the possibility that people could be
prosecuted in a way that we don’t like.  Maybe it will be exercised
against those for exercising free speech that we value.  Now I take
some comfort from Professor Rabkin’s point that it hasn’t been used
this way.  So the fact that it hasn’t been used this way leads me to
believe it’s not likely to be used in that way. But there is that danger.
But there’s also a danger of not having universal jurisdiction.  Because
what happens when people violate their own laws, the laws of nations,
and there’s nowhere they’re held accountable?  Their country won’t
prosecute them – what happens then?  Where would the German war
criminals have been tried but for an assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion?  Where would Milosevic be tried but for an assertion of universal
jurisdiction?  And so in the end, as you think about this discussion,
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what it really comes down to from a normative perspective: are the
benefits that we gain by having the concept of universal jurisdiction,
as a way of enforcing the rule of law, greater than the risks that there
are that people might be tried for things that we don’t want them tried
for?
I take comfort in the very history that Professor Rabkin evokes
and believes – that it’s clear to me that, if we believe in the rule of law,
there has to be someplace where there can be prosecutions.  And I
think that history gives us reason not to be too concerned about that.
Audience Member: My question is directed to the panel, but particu-
larly to professor O’Connell.  Is there some way that you can define
either enemy combatant or armed conflict, in a way that affords proper
balance to the individual liberties and to protection of security?
O’Connell: Well, I think the way international law has defined both
combatant and armed conflict is respectful of security concerns.  There
had been a move in some years, in particular, by human rights advo-
cates, to eventually restrict all military force to a rule of necessity, ba-
sically a law enforcement rule.  That is not the rule in international
law today.  When a state is attacked significantly, as Kuwait was in-
vaded by Iraq in 1990, international law does allow a right of self-de-
fense and the use of an armed conflict military force of a significant
level to liberate a state in that case.  And those who are members of
the regular armed forces are combatants, defined in the Geneva Con-
ventions and in the additional protocols and in the paper I included in
the materials just in case you’d like some more detail on this and some
footnotes.  It’s called Combatants in the Combat Zone.  But I think in
America today we’re still misled by this belief that we can accomplish
great security through military force.  Military force is suitable and
appropriate, as I said before, I’m married to a soldier, so I do think
that it’s appropriate in some occasions.  But I think that we have had a
tendency, in part, due to our own history, and we’re a country that was
built under both the rule of law and in a revolutionary war, so we’ve
had a great deal of confidence that we can accomplish a lot for our
country through military force.  But we’re at a time now when we have
to be more clever than that, when we have to use far more sophisti-
cated and fine-tuned responses to the challenges to our country, of
many kinds, in particular, security.
What we’ve seen in the actual cases is that law enforcement,
through international cooperation, is the most effective means of re-
sponding to terrorism in particular.  In the last month, over fourteen
high-ranking members of the Taliban have been arrested in Pakistan.
That is a far more sure way of getting a stable Pakistan, one that
doesn’t foment and create persons who want to do serious harm to the
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United States than attacking unlawfully, under international law,
which is well known to Pakistanis and creating revenge and anger
against the United States, which only fuels the cycle of revenge and
creates a more insecure place.  International law is very old law.  It’s
even older than the United States Constitution.  1648 is when we tend
to date modern international law.  The rules on the use of force have
grown up slowly over time, through great consensus, through trial and
error, through great catastrophe, and doing better.  And by now, if we
would comply with, and I agree with Professor Rabkin that we have a
poor record of really getting enforcement, and that’s some place where
I think we can do better, but these rules are wise rules that will guide
our country to a better international community and a better future.
If we had complied with the rules of international law, we would not
have invaded Iraq, we would not have opened Guantanamo Bay, we
would not have tortured persons.  And all three of those have led to
great insecurity for our country.  So in my view and after almost thirty
years of studying international law, especially the law of armed con-
flict, I would suggest to you that it’s the best guide for creating both a
world in which human rights will thrive, including our own human
rights as Americans, and in which we will have greater security going
forward in the future.
Audience Member: I have a question for Dean Chemerinsky, espe-
cially regarding your second point about how the Bush administration
claimed that no law applied to these detainees and how universal ju-
risdiction needed to be invoked to make certain Bush officials account-
able for their acts according to that stance.  However, doesn’t
international law require a different outcome?  Specifically that the
United States courts take up these claims because local remedies must
be exhausted.  Local law has to apply before international law, so isn’t
it far too early to even consider evoking your universal jurisdiction for
the Bush administration’s claims because the United States courts
still have to interpret the Constitution and in fact have granted these
detainees due process rights and have kind of struck down the Bush
administration’s stance.
Chemerinsky: Your point, I think, is a simple one, that all individuals
whose liberty is denied, all who are treated at the deprivation of lib-
erty, must have the law applied, that the Constitution and interna-
tional law have to apply to them.  I completely agree that the
preferable forum is a domestic forum.  The question is: can there be an
international forum?  And as uncomfortable as it is, I don’t see how if
you’ll accept the premise that our leaders violated treaties, interna-
tional law, why they’re any more immune from the forums that tried
Milosevic, why they’re any more immune than others who have vio-
lated international law.  So yes, in terms of your question, but I don’t
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think that that denies what I’m saying, only to the extent that Spain
wants to say that these individuals can be held accountable for violat-
ing international law, then I don’t see how that’s any different from
instances where American courts under the Alien Tort statute have
held individuals to be liable for acts that occurred outside their coun-
try.  Now, when they say that the Alien Tort statute was wrong, that
the Supreme Court was wrong in Alvarez-Machain, but that again con-
fuses the descriptive and the normative.
Rabkin: Ok, so I’ll use this opportunity to respond to what is I think a
grotesque misrepresentation of what we’re talking about.  What Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky is saying here is anytime American courts or any
court takes jurisdiction over an incident which occurred outside of its
territorial limits, well that’s a precedent for universal jurisdiction.  No
it isn’t.  Not at all.  I don’t know anyone who seriously believes that.
Of course there are some little, at the margins, claims of jurisdiction
for things that happened outside your territory, but that’s because
there’s some other nexus.  It involves your citizens, either as the perpe-
trators or as the victims.  That’s the usual thing.  What universal juris-
diction means is anyone.  Universal means everyone.  Anyone can
assert jurisdiction over any incident that is satisfied by somebody’s
idea of whatever it is that is now in universal jurisdiction.  Really bad
human rights violations, whatever they are.  Anyone, without any
other nexus, just saying, “We in Germany believe in human rights (be-
cause we all know how much they believe in human rights) so we have
the duty to go out there and prosecute Donald Rumsfeld.”
Now that is not the Spanish case.  The Spanish case is not uni-
versal jurisdiction at all.  The Spanish case is: these are Spanish citi-
zens who were injured in Guantanamo and we’re standing up for
them.  I’m unhappy about that, but I don’t think, woo that’s terrible,
that’s a new precedent.  That’s a typical kind of conflict of laws, conflict
of jurisdiction thing, and we have to negotiate with Spain about what
to do there.  That is going to happen in the world.  The United States
itself does that and has done that from the beginning.  The piracy
clause in the Constitution – surely, surely, nobody ever thought that it
was involving things that happen in the United States.  By definition
it says in the Constitution “on the high seas,” but that doesn’t mean
it’s precedent for universal jurisdiction.  What they were thinking of
was either pirate attacks on American ships or Americans engaging in
piracy.  Well good then, we would have jurisdiction.
That is very different from saying that the whole world can
jump in whenever it wants to.  That is a really bad idea.  Among other
reasons it is a really bad idea, and not only because there are so many
other countries and it is so hard to bargain simultaneously.  It’s a bad
idea because it makes the issue completely abstract.  You can’t say, as
336 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:3
the Germans did, our paragons of human rights, we feel really bad
that some people got killed in Afghanistan because we called in an air
strike and it was a mistake.  We feel really bad, a million Euros?
Would a million Euros do it?  Two million?  I mean, they’re trying to
buy them off, which they probably will do.  And that is not actually
unreasonable.  They’re saying, “Oh, we’re sorry but these things hap-
pen.”  If it’s one country that is asserting jurisdiction, you could hope
to deal with the actual litigants.  Maybe not, but you have a better
chance.  If it’s just a completely abstract claim based on just: this is
wrong, and the world has an obligation to see that justice is done in
the world.  I don’t think I’m caricaturing it.  I think that is what Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky is saying: “We need to have universal jurisdiction
because we need to have this fall back to make sure that justice is done
in the world.”  No we don’t.  This is preposterous.
I mean why even talk about some Americans did this and some
Americans did that.  How many people were killed in China?  Fifty
million? 100 million?  I mean it’s unbelievable what happened in
China.  How many people were killed by the Bolsheviks over seventy
years of power in Russia?  It’s at least in the tens of millions.  Nobody
was prosecuted in Russia.  Nobody in Europe was so worked up about
Guantanamo and John Yoo.  Has any of them said, “We’ve got to prose-
cute some of the worst Communist perpetrators in Russia.”?  Of course
not.  In China, do they say that someone has to be prosecuted?  No, of
course not.  How is it that Europeans can go to sleep at night, knowing
that monstrous crimes have gone unpunished?  By the way has Spain
ever prosecuted any of those responsible for Fascism?  No.  Germany?
Did they really go through and comprehensively punish everyone?  Ha,
ha, ha.  Don’t be silly.  So how is it that they can accept all these
things?  Well, they say the following, which is not unreasonable: “The
world has to go forward and it is not always the best thing to ensure
that everyone who deserves to be punished is punished.”
If I could just give one last example which means a lot to me
because I lived in Washington, and now I live in Virginia.  President
Lincoln said during the Civil War, “Those who have killed black troops
during the Civil War, we will kill you.  This is terrible.  This is against
the law of war.”  And what happened afterwards?  We have an am-
nesty.  No one was punished for that.  People did terrible things but
there was an amnesty.  A decision was made, a political decision.  It
was more important to bring the country together.  I believe this is the
most generous interpretation of why people in Western Europe who
were so high in their moral standards looked at Russia and China and
said, “We’re not telling you what to do.”  Move forward the best that
you can.  To say that that decision can never be made, there can never
be an amnesty, there can never be a pardon unless you persuade 200
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other countries and they relent and say it’s ok to let John Yoo continue
at Berkeley, this is not a recipe for a more peaceful world.
O’Connell: Just very briefly, I think they can find us.  We are all on
the World Wide Web.  I just think in closing that the idea of a chaotic
world out there, where Europeans are running after Americans in or-
der to try them for all kinds of unfair reasons, while at the same time
they are letting all kinds of Chinese tyrants and murderers go free.
This is just a caricature, of course.  We have very few of our most im-
portant treaties: the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against
Torture, and just a few other human rights treaties that provide for
universal jurisdiction.  And the fact that it’s not being exercised more
often, I think, is unfortunate.  I do think that the United States should
be encouraged to respect its own provisions of its treaties that it’s com-
mitted to, and bring these prosecutions internally.  That is the ideal.
If we do not do it, and other counties that are equally committed to
these very important, very few, very well-drafted, long-standing trea-
ties, around which much of our law and much our understanding of
how to be normative people in the world, moral individuals of moral
countries, if we need encouragement to do the right thing here, that is
why we are part of an international community.  So, I don’t want this
sense that there is chaos running amuck.  We have a system that we
are committed to, that we have been committed to for a very long time,
decades, this is new law since the second world war.  I, for one, would
like to see it better enforced, not let go because some people fear it will
become a world of chaos.  That’s not what’s happening now, and there’s
no real evidence that that is what will happen.
